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In this note, we analyze whether the International Cycling Union’s ‘index of 
suspicion’, which reflects the extent to which a rider is suspected of using 
doping, correlates with performance during the 2010 Tour de France and the 
one year period leading up to the 2010 Tour de France. Though our point 
estimates suggest a medium sized performance improving effect of being 
suspected of doping, the index of suspicion can only explain a very small part of 
the variation in performance. We also present some limited evidence that this 
could be due to the fact that doping has little effect on the outcome of the Tour 
de France. 
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The use of past blood tests, the so-called biological passports, to detect suspicious changes in 
blood values is becoming a more and more widespread weapon in the fight again doping in 
sports. For example, the 2012 London Olympics will be the first Olympics where such tests will 
be used for certain competitions (see McGrath 2011
1). Despite this increasing popularity, the 
usefulness of such tests to detect doping is still controversial, from an ethical and legal point of 
view but also from the point of view of its capacity to detect actual doping. 
One of the reasons that it is hard to check the usefulness of these tests is that it is very hard to get 
the biological passport data for a large sample of athletes. In this paper, we use, what is as far as 
we know, the first such large dataset with publicly available information on the biological 
passports of almost 200 top level cyclists.   
On May 13, the French Sport Newspaper L’Equipe published an ‘Index of Suspicion’, a list  
containing the names of about 200 professional cyclists and the degree to which their blood 
values were ‘suspicious’, that is showed signs of the possible use of doping, at the eve of the 
2010 Tour de France, arguable the most important international cycling race. This list, made by a 
doping (detection) specialist, on demand of the International Cycling Union, is based on an 
evaluation of blood tests of the cyclists, tests submitted between 2008 and the eve of the Tour 
2010. On the basis of this evaluation, the riders were categorized into eleven categories, ranging 
from 0 (not suspect) to 10 (very suspect). 
In this note, we first analyze whether this ‘index of suspicion’ can help to predict the 
performance during the 2010 Tour de France. If suspicious blood values are a good indicator of 
the use of performance enhancing drugs, and if, in addition, performance enhancing drugs 
actually do enhance performance significantly, there should be a positive correlation between the 
‘index of suspicion’ and performance. The absence of such correlation would suggest either that 
doping is not effective or alternatively that the ‘index of suspicion’ is not a good indicator of 
doping. 
We then try to distinguish between these two explanations by running an instrumental variables 




as belonging to a team where managers have been suspected of doping, or such as having been 
suspected of doping based on other indicators than the biological passport. The reason to use 
instruments is the idea that if the ‘index of suspicion’ is an imperfect indicator of the use of 
effective performance enhancing drugs, then the coefficient of the ‘index of suspicion’ in a 
performance regression will be biased towards zero due to the so-called ‘errors in variables” 
problem. To get an unbiased coefficient of the effectiveness of doping, we can instrument one 
(imperfect) indicator of doping by other (equally imperfect) indicators of doping (see 
Wooldridge, pp. 526-527).  
This paper is not the first paper that investigates doping in sports (see for example Berentsen, 
2001, Haugen, 2004 or Eber, 2008 for a theoretical analysis of doping behavior or Dilger et al. 
(2007) for a selective survey of doping cases in cycling and other sports) or the determinants of 
success in cycling (for example, Torgler, 2007). This is the first paper however that studies, 




a.  Does the ‘index of suspicion’ predict performance 
Our main variable of interest is the categorical variable which reflects the score on the ‘Index of 
Suspicion’. Categorical variables are typically included as explanatory variables in regression 
analysis by creating a dummy variable for each specific category. However, given that there are 
a lot of categories (11 categories, ranging is from 0 to 10) and some of these categories have only 
few observations in them, one might want to consider this index as almost continuous and hence, 
include the index as just one variable. Below we also present a specification where, instead of the 
index, we included 2 dummies each grouping a number of categories – an omitted first dummy 
for category 0 and 1 reflecting little or no suspicion of doping, a second dummy for categories 
2,3, and 4 reflecting a medium level of suspicion, the third dummy being for categories 5 and up, 
reflecting high levels of suspicion. In this way, we allow for a non-linear effect of the doping 
categories on performance. The first two dummies represent each about 40 % of the riders in the 
                                                            
2 Zorzoli (2011) presents a graph showing that after the introduction of the passports the percentage of suspicious 
blood samples has decreased substantially. 5 
 
sample, while the last category represents about 20 percent. A third specification compares the 
performance of those with little or no suspicion of doping (categories 0 and 1) to the other 
cyclists. 
 
Table 1 gives the results of regressions where we run a specific dimension of performance on a 
constant and our doping variable(s). As performance measures we use the final standing for the 
yellow jersey (the ranking based on time needed to finish the race, both the rank and the time 
behind the winner are used as dependent variable), the final standing for the green jersey 
(rewards sprinting success, both rank and number of points) and the final standing for the 
climbers jersey (rewards performance in climbing, both rank and number of points).  
[Insert table 1 here] 
We do not find an effect of our ‘suspicion of doping’ variables on performance in terms of 
sprinting or climbing but we do find a significant effect on the time needed to finish the race: a 
rider in the highest category of doping (category 10) needed about 25 to 40 minutes less to finish 
the 2010 Tour de France and would finish 16 to 24 places higher than a rider in the lowest 
category of doping (category 0). These differences are statistically significant (or close to being 
significantly different from 0, depending on the specification, but the explanatory power, as 
reflected in the adjusted R
2, is very low at 1 to 2 percent. The ‘best’ specification in terms of 
significance and adjusted R
2 is the one where we use the dummy that compares those with little 
or no suspicion of doping (categories 0 and 1) to the other cyclists. 
In addition to the regressions of table 1, we also checked whether being more suspect increases 
the chance to finish the Tour de France and whether the results of specific stages (there were 21 
stages in the tour de France 2010) are correlated with the ‘index of suspicion’. While we did not 
find an effect on the chance to finish the 2010 Tour de France, we found (see table 2) a strong 
negative correlation between the level of significance of the doping variable(s) and the level of 
difficulty of the stage as measured by the sum of the kilometers where riders have to climb, 6 
 
weighted by the steepness of the various climbs (the average slope coefficient times length in 
kilometers of each hill or mountain
3).  
[Insert table 2 here] 
For example table 2 shows that stage 17 which has the second highest degree of difficulty shows 
that riders in the lowest category needed about 7 minutes more (a rider in category 10 needs 10*-
0.75 minutes less, significant at 10 percent) than riders who were in the highest category of 
suspicion The correlation between the t statistic (which is negative) of the doping variables and 
the level of difficulty of the race is about -0.5, hence the higher the difficulty the more negative 
the t statistic is
4. 
Table 3 runs the same regressions as in Table 1 but adds a number of reasonably exogenous 
variables that could influence performance
5. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
Following Torgler (2007), we include the body mass index (weight divided by the square of 
length in meters) and a dummy for French riders, the latter reflecting the higher incentives the 
home riders have. We also include the age at the start of the 2010 Tour.  
When adding these additional variables to our regression (Table 3), the results are largely 
unaffected, with doping related categories only being significant for the final standing of the 
2010 Tour but not for competition for the green jersey or the climbers’ jersey
6. A higher BMI is 
bad for a rider’s final standing (and for his climbing performance, but good for his sprinting 
performance) and older riders have a better rank at the end (and climb better). Similarly, French 
riders are higher ranked in the final standing and are better at climbing. Comparing the size of 
                                                            
3 Stage 9 is the hardest of all stages with a series of 5 famous mountains as follows: Côte de Châtillon - 2.1 km 
climb to 3.9 %, Col de la Colombière - 16.5 km climb to 6.7 %, Col des Aravis - 7.6 km climb to 5.9 %, Col des 
Saisies - 14.4 km climb to 5.1 %, Col de la Madeleine - 25.5 km climb to 6.2 %. The average difficulty score for this 
stage is 2.1 x 3.9 + 16.5 x 6.7 + 7.6 x 5.9 + 14.4 x 5.1 + 25.5 x 6.2 = 395.12. 
4 Given the different nature of the stages, the time between riders varies quite a lot from one race to another and 
hence coefficients are not really comparable across races. Hence, we focus on t statistics. Note also that some easy 
races ended in sprints of (almost) the whole group of riders and hence have little variation in the dependent variable. 
Table 2 only shows results for the regression with the index as explanatory variable. Using dummies for specific 
groups of categories gives similar results.  
5 They are only ‘reasonably’ exogenous as one could argue that doping could influence weight and the length of a 
riders’ career, the latter being correlated highly with the age of the rider. 
6 Similar tables for the green jersey and the climbers’ jersey are available upon demand from the authors. 7 
 
the effects, one can see, for example, that being somewhat or highly suspect will about offset the 
effect on the general standing of the Tour de France of having a BMI that is one point higher or 
is about equivalent to the effect of being 8 to 10 years older. 
In addition to these reasonably exogenous additional variables, we also have measures of past 
performance in our dataset (the best place in the last 3 tours, whether the person participated in 
the Tour before). Unlike Torgler (2007), in our case, it might be preferable not to include such 
past performance rankings, however, as these could be influenced by doping themselves. If we 
do include these variables, our doping variables become insignificant, including in the final 
standing regression.  
b.  The effect of doping on performance 
So far we showed that the index of suspicion does ‘affect’ performance somewhat, but we also 
showed that variations in doping can only explain a small part of the variation in performance.  
This could be interpreted as meaning that the index of suspicion is not a very good indicator of 
doping. However, such interpretation would rely on the assumption that performance enhancing 
drugs is indeed effective in enhancing performance. Of course, this underlying assumption might 
be wrong, and maybe, performance enhancing drugs does not enhance performance much
7. 
To be able to find the performance enhancing effects of doping (in contrast to ‘effect’ of the 
‘index of suspicion’), we treat the ‘index of suspicion’ as variable that measures doping use with 
error. To find the effect of doping we thus need to solve an error-in-variable problem, which can 
be done by instrumenting our ‘index of suspicion’ by other (possibly imperfect) measures of the 
use of doping.  
There are several possible instruments. First from the “cyclisme-dopage
8” website, a website that 
collects information about doping in cycling we create a dummy that indicates whether a 2010 
Tour de France participant has ever been caught using doping
9. Second, we use the same source 
                                                            
7 An alternative but not testable hypothesis would be that riders are all equally doped which also would lead to the 
conclusion that doping has no effect on the race outcome. 
8 http://www.cyclisme-dopage.com/chiffres/tdf2010.htm 
9  It includes the cyclists that have had a positive doping control, have admitted they used doping or have been 
sanctioned (by Court, Federation or Team) in the framework of a doping affair. 8 
 
to create two team-level variables: one variable that indicates the percentage of team managers
10 
of a given team who were ever been caught using doping (as a former rider) and another variable 
that indicates the percentage of team mates that have been caught using doping. The idea behind 
these two variables is that an individual is more likely to be using doping in an environment 
where doping is more common (either because there is a less negative attitude to doping use or 
because there is an easier access to doping products). Note that recently the UCI introduced a 
new rule that bans passed doping convicts of ever managing a team
11. 
Table 4 gives the first stage result of our instrumental variable regressions. Table 5 gives the 
second stage results
12. 
From table 4, one can see that our instruments are only weakly correlated with our doping 
indicator which means we have to interpret our IV regression results with care. A rider’s own 
doping past is correlated with his suspicion index score, but neither is the doping past of the 
managers or of other team members. The second stage regression result shows a sizeable point 
estimate of the effect of doping, but also that this point estimate is insignificantly different from 
zero. The latter suggests that the low predictive power of the index of suspicion could be related 
to the fact that doping enhancing techniques are not very effective. Of course, the weakness of 
our instruments makes it hard to make strong conclusions about this. Still, the latter is consistent 
with Enserink (2008) who wrote: “By the tough standards of modern medicine, there’s little hard 
evidence for the efficacy of dozens of compounds on the list of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA). They are rarely tested in placebo-controlled trials; for most, the evidence is what 
medical researchers would call “anecdotal.” 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate to what extent the ‘Index of Suspicion’ of doping, which was used 
by the International Cycling Union to monitor participants of the 2010 Tour de France, correlates 
with the performance of these participants. Our point estimates show a medium sized 
                                                            
10 We get info about team managers of the 2010 Tour de France from the http://www.cyclisme‐dopage.com 
website. 
11 http://velonews.competitor.com/2011/06/news/uci-to-ban-doping-violators-from-team-staff-positions_179000 
12 We only present the IV results for the Yellow jersey competition. We find no effects for other competitions. We 
use both 2SLS IV and CMP procedure (Roodman, 2007), with both techniques leading to the same conclusion. 
Using dummies rather than the full index of suspicion leads to similar conclusions. 9 
 
performance improving effect of not having a low suspicion index on the overall standing at the 
end of the Tour de France and on the results of some difficult stages, but not on the competition 
for the green or the climbers’ jersey. At the same time, even the significant effects we find often 
have large standard errors and in all cases, the suspicion index can only explain a very small part 
of the variation in performance, this despite the fact that there is a substantial variation in the 
degree to which riders are suspected of using doping.  
Using an instrumental variable approach, we then try to establish whether this lack of predictive 
power is due to the low effectiveness of performance enhancing drug or because the index of 
suspicion is not a good indicator of the use of performance enhancing drugs. Using instruments 
based on (alleged) past doping of the rider, his team mates and managers, we find little evidence 
that doping actually enhances performance, but the weakness of our instruments means we have 
to interpret this finding with care. 
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  Yellow 
  Time    Time  Time Rank Rank  Rank 
Index of Suspicion  -3.94*      -2.388     
 (-1.74)      (-1.60)     
Index of Suspicion [2-4]    -26.72**      -17.345**   
   (-2.09)      (-2.05)   
Index of Suspicion [5-10]    -22.78      -14.188   
   (-1.49)      (-1.40)   
Index of Suspicion [2-10]      -25.310**      -16.213** 
     (-2.20)      (-2.11) 
_cons 154***  158***  158***  92***  96***  96*** 
 (18.9)  (17.7)  (17.8)  (17)  (15.9)  (15.9) 
Adj R
2   0.012  0.016  0.021  0.009  0.015  0.02 
N 170  170  170  170  170  170 
Omitted category is the no suspicion category, which consists of categories 0 and 1. We use robust standard errors. 
  Green Jersey  Climbers Jersey 
  Time    Time Time Rank Rank Rank Time   Time Time Rank Rank Rank 
Index of Suspicion  0.515      -0.044      -0.182      0.497     
  (0.42)    (-0.03)    (-0.22)    (0.56)    
Index of Suspicion [2-4]    2.851      3.703      -3.578      3.846   
   (0.39)    (0.45)    (-0.74)    (0.76)  
Index of Suspicion [5-10]    7.785      -0.284      -3.96      5.901   
   (0.83)    (-0.03)    (-0.66)    (1.01)  
Index of Suspicion [2-10]      4.62      2.274      -3.715      4.583 
      (0.71)     (0.30)     (-0.83)      (1.00) 
_cons  29***  28***  28*** 85*** 84*** 84*** 17*** 19*** 19*** 64***  63***  63*** 
  (6.4)  (6.3)  (6.3)  (15.8)  (14.8)  (14.9)  (5.6) (5.2) (5.2)  (19.4)  (16.8)  (16.8) 
Adj R
2    -0.005  -0.008  -0.003 -0.006  -0.01 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004  -0.005  0 12 
 




  Race1  Race2  Race3 Race4 Race5 Race6 Race7  Race8  Race9  Race10  Race11 
Index of Suspicion  -0.021  -0.008  -0.186 -0.175 -0.004  0  -0.007  -0.568*** -0.254  -0.669*  0.1 
  (-1.35) (-0.36) (-1.43)  (-1.24)  (-0.22)  (0.01) (-0.12)  (-2.62)  (-0.81)  (-1.90)  (1.55) 
_cons  1.123***  0.125*  7.433*** 6.357*** 0.251*** 0.592*** 0.556** 14.695***  19.393***  23.464*** 14.122*** 
  (16.47) (1.70) (14.41) (11.60)  (3.25)  (4.23)  (2.43)  (16.74)  (15.89)  (18.85)  (41.98) 
Adj R
2.  0.005  -0.004  0.004  0.003  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  0.024 -0.002 0.014 0.004 
N  197  195  193 189 189 188  188 186  186  181  181 
Difficulty  0  0  113.64  4.76  6.24  14.7  43.94  259.57  225.58  395.12  125.65 
 
  Race12 Race13 Race14 Race15 Race16 Race17 Race18 Race19 Race20 Race21 
Index of Suspicion  -0.023  -0.326**  0.071  -0.369  -0.164  -0.752*  -0.346  -0.003  -0.094  0.001 
  (-0.24) (-2.53) (0.72) (-0.90) (-0.53) (-1.91) (-1.05) (-0.18) (-1.34) (0.24) 
_cons  2.125*** 6.615*** 3.068*** 22.549***  19.276***  24.712***  20.461*** 0.276*** 7.754***  0.025** 
  (5.87) (11.17) (8.62)  (14.97) (17.42) (16.57) (17.32)  (3.91) (28.60) (2.04) 
Adj R
2  -0.005 0.025 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 0.014  0.001 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 
N  178 176 175 175 174 172 171 170 170 170 







  Yellow 
 Time  Time  Time  Rank  Rank  Rank 
Index of Suspicion  -3.276      -2.102     
  (-1.44)    (-1.39)    
Index of Suspicion [2-4]    -24.441*      -16.405**   
   (-1.97)    (-2.02)  
Index of Suspicion [5-10]    -19.558      -13.038   
   (-1.26)    (-1.27)  
Index of Suspicion [2-10]      -22.805**      -15.276** 
     (-1.99)    (-2.02) 
Body  Mass  Index  20.121*** 20.046*** 19.997*** 13.324*** 13.250*** 13.216*** 
  (4.66) (4.64) (4.65) (4.66) (4.65) (4.66) 
Age -2.891*  -2.907*  -2.883*  -1.575  -1.58  -1.563 
  (-1.93) (-1.93) (-1.92) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.58) 
French  -16.636 -17.235 -17.677 -13.268 -13.822  -14.127* 
  (-1.30) (-1.32) (-1.37) (-1.56) (-1.60) (-1.67) 
_cons  -184.524* -177.338* -176.856*  -140.861**  -135.417* -135.085* 
  (-1.78) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-2.05) (-1.96) (-1.96) 
Adj. R
2  0.099 0.104 0.109 0.097 0.103 0.108 







Table 4: First stage IV regression – the determinants of the Index of Suspicion 
  Index 
Body Mass Index  -0.23 
  (-1.47) 
Age  0.04 
  (0.73) 
French  -1.73*** 
  (-4.02) 
Percentage of Teammates  with Doping Past  -0.72 
  (-0.47) 
Percentage of Managers with Doping Past  -0.07 
  (-0.06) 
Doping Past Dummy   1.17* 
  (1.90) 
_cons  6.75*** 
  (2.14) 
Adj. R
2  0.12 
N  170 
 
Table 5: IV Results 
  Yellow Jersey -Time 
Index of Suspicion  -20.729 
  (-1.06) 
Body Mass Index  15.413** 
  -2.26 
Age  -1.764 15 
 
  (-0.86) 
French  -47.04 
  (-1.29) 
_cons  -64.159 
  (-0.37) 
Adj. R
2   
N  170 
 
 